| Comment: | repo: private repositories
Visibility on the registry, gated at every read path: pages, API, search, file reads and the sync endpoint all answer 404 for a repository the caller may not see. 404 and not 403 — a 403 confirms the repository exists, which is the one thing a private repository must not confirm. The listing filters by visibility too. A list that names a private repository has leaked it whatever the page then refuses to show. The gate lives in Deps.repoFor, where d.repo already resolved the store, so a new op cannot forget it. The API router now resolves identity for ANONYMOUS ops as well: a read op that never looks at credentials cannot tell a repository's own collaborators from strangers, and would lock them out of their own repository. Two faults found while verifying. Repositories named by --repo had no registry row, so taking one private updated nothing and reported success — a security control that claims to work while doing nothing. They are recorded now, and SetRepoVisibility refuses a name it does not hold. Second, the sync path was ungated: a private repository whose pages refuse anonymous readers while zit clone hands over every artifact is not private. Verified: anonymous and unprivileged accounts get 404 everywhere and a short list; a collaborator with read sees it; admins see everything. |
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| Timelines: | family | ancestors | descendants | both | trunk |
| Files: | files | file ages | folders |
| SHA3-256: |
f88e97a9fd0cfb06b0993dc0e3d3bae0 |
| User & Date: | dmestas on 2026-08-18 10:54:17.475 |
| Other Links: | manifest | tags |
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2026-08-18
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| 11:06 |
repo: settings page, descriptions everywhere
repo.update replaces repo.visibility and applies a repository's settings whole — a settings form submits every field it manages, so partial-update semantics would only add a way for the two to disagree about what absent means. The CLI reads current settings before writing, so 'repo private' no longer blanks the description. A settings page at /r/{repo}/settings, admin-gated, and the description now appears on the repository itself rather than only in the listing: a reader arriving from a link otherwise sees nav and a file tree and no statement of what the project is. check-in: a41b410958 user: dmestas tags: trunk | |
| 10:54 |
repo: private repositories
Visibility on the registry, gated at every read path: pages, API, search, file reads and the sync endpoint all answer 404 for a repository the caller may not see. 404 and not 403 — a 403 confirms the repository exists, which is the one thing a private repository must not confirm. The listing filters by visibility too. A list that names a private repository has leaked it whatever the page then refuses to show. The gate lives in Deps.repoFor, where d.repo already resolved the store, so a new op cannot forget it. The API router now resolves identity for ANONYMOUS ops as well: a read op that never looks at credentials cannot tell a repository's own collaborators from strangers, and would lock them out of their own repository. Two faults found while verifying. Repositories named by --repo had no registry row, so taking one private updated nothing and reported success — a security control that claims to work while doing nothing. They are recorded now, and SetRepoVisibility refuses a name it does not hold. Second, the sync path was ungated: a private repository whose pages refuse anonymous readers while zit clone hands over every artifact is not private. Verified: anonymous and unprivileged accounts get 404 everywhere and a short list; a collaborator with read sees it; admins see everything. check-in: f88e97a9fd user: dmestas tags: trunk | |
| 02:09 |
account: manage identity through the API, and stop lying about why
Six ops (account.list/add/passwd/delete/grant/revoke, admin) plus quarry accounts on top of them. Creating a login or granting someone read on a repository no longer needs shell access on the server. quarry account still opens OLTP directly and has to: the FIRST account must exist before any server runs or any admin exists to authenticate as. Everything after that is the API, so the CLI has no privileged path. The verifier never crosses the seam in either direction, and account.add /passwd scrub the password out of any error before it travels — an error is the one value that reaches a log, an HTTP body and a terminal at once. Verify returns a three-valued Decision instead of a bool. Denied and Insufficient are not the same thing and the wire has separate codes for them: an authenticated client short of a capability was being told 401 with a challenge, which invites it to retry the same password forever. Now 403, and deliberately without a challenge. A harness test pinned the old behaviour and was updated with the reason. check-in: 86880118d5 user: dmestas tags: trunk | |