Timeline

Regenerated from the RFC suite after the erratum repo-state-00-s4-unclassifiable-artifact was applied. New §4.4 states what assembly does with a stored artifact classification rejects: an artifact whose octets hash to the name it is stored under is opaque to repository state and MUST NOT fail the assembly, while one whose octets do not hash to its name is a distinct integrity failure and MUST be rejected. The remaining §4 subsections renumber behind it.

The draft was previously silent on this, and that silence was the trap: an implementation conforming to both drafts could reject an artifact per the required-card rule and then treat that rejection as fatal, which made the canonical fossil repository unassemblable. src/update.zig implements the rule this text now carries. check-in: 42e1faa9fc user: dmestas tags: trunk, version-0.1.2

The 0.1.2 release check-in carried the version bump and the README pointer but not the notes themselves: the add that would have tracked them was refused by a locked checkout database, and the refusal was hidden behind a pipe that kept only the last line of output. The file existed on disk and in no commit. check-in: aabc10268a user: dmestas tags: trunk

Two defects made zit unusable against a repository of real size and real history. Serving a sync round cost work proportional to the served store rather than the request, so past a few thousand artifacts a round outran the connection deadline and the server answered nothing at all. Repository-state assembly rejected an entire repository over one stored artifact it declined to classify, while every read verb skipped the same artifact.

Together they meant a clone of the canonical fossil repository could be fetched but not used. It now clones in 67 rounds and materialises all 983 files of the check-in, each byte-identical to fossil's own checkout of it. check-in: 800caecbf2 user: dmestas tags: trunk

A conforming repository contains artifacts a conforming parser declines, and assembly rejected the whole repository over one of them while every read verb skipped it. Bytes that hash to the name they are stored under are stored correctly and merely unclassifiable, so they are opaque to state and skipped; bytes that do not are an integrity failure and stay fatal.

This closes the tolerance half of the update-diagnostics work. On a clone of the canonical fossil repository, update now materialises all 983 files byte-identical to fossil's own checkout. check-in: 6a0f1f3f66 user: dmestas tags: trunk

A conforming repository contains artifacts a conforming parser declines. The artifact grammar requires the U card on a wiki artifact; fossil elides it when the submitter is "nobody", stores the result and syncs it. A clone of the canonical fossil repository therefore carries such artifacts, and assembly rejected the whole repository over one of them while timeline, ls, info and branch read the same store correctly.

The two conditions are separated by the name. Bytes that hash to the name they are stored under arrived and were stored correctly, so the only event is that this reader's grammar does not admit them; the artifact is opaque to state and is skipped, exactly as a non-participating type already is. Bytes that do not hash to their name are an integrity failure and stay fatal. Verification runs before the skip, which is what keeps the second from being swallowed by the first.

On a clone of the fossil repository, 67499 artifacts: update went from exit 1 having materialised nothing, to materialising all 983 files byte-identical to fossil's own checkout of the same check-in. closed check-in: f4736670a8 user: dmestas tags: fix10-tolerance

Two costs made a clone of a large repository O(rounds x store) of work; past a few thousand artifacts a round outran the connection deadline and the server answered nothing at all.

The reply's advertise walk classified every rid by calling content(), which INFLATES a wire-backed entry, so announcing the store cost its uncompressed size every round. It now reads held(), answering from the retained form alone. The send gate still reads content(): uploading composes from plaintext.

ServeCtx caches the snapshot and rebuilds only when a stat shows the log grew, so a commit made alongside a live server is still advertised next request. That rebuild is O(store) and stays out of every client's budget: serve primes before it listens, and a round that appends rebuilds before returning. Reuse needs isolation, since the responder interns phantoms as it answers, so a new OverlayStore gives each round a write overlay. Inflating memoises, so a snapshot outliving its round accumulates the whole repository's plaintext; it is released per round.

The one conflict, at the tail of src/cmd/sync.zig, was two independent test appends; resolved as the union. check-in: 6763d35da7 user: dmestas tags: trunk

update, open, merge and bisect collapsed ApplyError.StateRecordInvalid and ApplyError.Corrupt onto one line, "cannot read repository: repository is corrupt". Corrupt means stored bytes do not match the name they are stored under. StateRecordInvalid means only that a stored artifact was not usable as a check-in state record, which says nothing about integrity. An intact fossil clone reaches the second routinely, so update accused an undamaged clone of corruption while timeline read the same store fine.

StateRecordInvalid now carries its own reason text, shared across the four verbs so they cannot drift or re-merge. The bisect mapper had a blanket else arm swallowing the whole set into the corruption line; it is now exhaustive.

Diagnostics only: assembly still rejects these artifacts, so update still exits 1 on such a clone. The tolerance fix is separate; the shape that triggers it, an anonymous wiki page with no U card, is pinned. check-in: e3bbb4ff22 user: dmestas tags: trunk

Two costs made a clone of a large repository O(rounds x store) of work; past a few thousand artifacts a round outran the connection deadline and the server answered nothing at all.

The reply's advertise walk classified every rid by calling content(), which INFLATES a wire-backed entry, so announcing the store cost its uncompressed size every round. It now reads held(), answering from the retained form alone. The send gate still reads content(): uploading composes from plaintext.

ServeCtx caches the snapshot and rebuilds only when a stat shows the log grew, so a commit made alongside a live server is still advertised next request. That rebuild is O(store) and stays out of every client's budget: serve primes before it listens, and a round that appends rebuilds before returning. Reuse needs isolation, since the responder interns phantoms as it answers, so a new OverlayStore gives each round a write overlay.

Inflating memoises, so a snapshot outliving its round accumulates the whole repository's plaintext. It is released per round. Four clones of 3001 artifacts, ReleaseFast: 12 MB and 0.09 s, against 26 MB and 0.15 s. closed check-in: e2e9233582 user: dmestas tags: fix9-serve-stall

zit update, open, merge and bisect collapsed ApplyError.StateRecordInvalid and ApplyError.Corrupt onto one line, "cannot read repository: repository is corrupt". They are different claims. Corrupt means stored bytes do not match the name they are stored under. StateRecordInvalid means only that a stored artifact was not usable as a check-in state record, which says nothing about integrity.

An intact fossil clone reaches the second routinely: fossil stores and syncs artifacts it declines to crosslink itself. Assembly treats those as fatal while the read verbs skip them, so update accused an undamaged clone of corruption while timeline read the same store fine.

StateRecordInvalid now carries its own reason text, shared across the four verbs so they cannot drift or re-merge. The bisect mapper had a blanket else arm swallowing the whole set into that corruption line; it is now exhaustive over ApplyError.

Diagnostics only: assembly still rejects these artifacts, so update still exits 1 on such a clone. The tolerance fix is separate; the shape that triggers it, an anonymous wiki page with no U card, is pinned. closed check-in: f75dfdfbe7 user: dmestas tags: fix10-update-diag

zit serve rebuilt its whole in-memory snapshot from the log on every request, and classified held-vs-phantom by calling content on every rid, forcing a full inflate of the entire repository per request. A clone cost O(rounds x store) of server work; past a few thousand artifacts one round outran the connection deadline and the server answered nothing at all.

ArtifactStore grows heldCount, the aggregate of the existing non-inflating held predicate, and serve counts with it rather than re-deriving a worse predicate caller-side. ServeCtx caches the snapshot and rebuilds only when a stat shows the append-only log grew, so a commit made alongside a live server is still advertised on the next request.

Reuse needs isolation: the responder interns phantoms and upgrades entries as it answers, and that would change what later rounds serve. A new OverlayStore answers each request over a per-request write overlay, reads falling through, writes confined to the overlay. The persist pass now takes an ArtifactStore.

On 67,499 artifacts: unfixed, no round completes; fixed, one snapshot build then sub-millisecond rounds. check-in: 2874978461 user: dmestas tags: fix9-serve-stall