Lands P4-F6, closing the last unfuzzed attack surface in the release scope. transport.zig and serve.zig are the only two files a remote peer can reach with bytes it fully controls, and neither had a fuzz target: the sync_parsers_adversarial target covers the layer above them, so the HTTP framing itself — the first code to touch untrusted input — was exercised only by hand-written smoke cases. These two targets hit that framing directly.

The increment: src/transport_fuzz.zig (205 L) and src/serve_fuzz.zig (303 L), registered in the fuzz_tests.zig dispatch table alongside the existing 24 and pinned by that file's registration test. serve.zig's driveHttp is promoted to pub with a comment stating why — it is the receiveHead to handleHttpRequest seam the smoke tests and the fuzz target both need, and duplicating it would have meant fuzzing a copy of the request path rather than the real one. Both sides stay in-memory, so neither target binds a port and neither can flake in CI. dst.zig picks up the two targets plus fuzz_tests.zig itself, the latter so the registration pin has a test step to run in: zig build fuzz has none.

Evidence, re-verified on the merged tree rather than on the branch, since trunk had advanced: zig fmt --check ., zig build, and zig build test each exit 0. Both new targets run clean seeded — invoking zig build fuzz with each target name and --seed 1 exits 0 for transport_frame_garbage and for serve_request_garbage — and found no crash, leak, or UB to fix, so this step carries no pinned-seed regression. The merge reported no conflicts; a repo-wide grep for conflict markers is clean, and fossil extras is empty, so both added files are tracked and nothing referenced went unadded. check-in: b8db5ecabd user: dmestas tags: trunk