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10 most recent check-ins occurring on or after 2026-07-27 19:57:22.

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2026-07-28
02:35
fix: derive mlink, plink, tagxref and leaf the way canonical fossil does (#193) (#211)

A full clone of the Fossil self-hosting repository disagreed with what canonical fossil derives from the SAME artifacts: mlink -3,351 rows, tagxref -632, plink -5, leaf -1. `fossil rebuild` on our own clone put every one of them back, so the artifact set was complete and the fault was entirely in crosslink-time derivation.

Six independent causes, each verified against `fossil rebuild` on a 67.6k-blob corpus clone:

mlink, -3,351. An mlink row records a parent-to-child TRANSITION, and a merge check-in has more than one parent. Canonical runs the same file-level diff once per parent -- primary, then each merge parent, then each cherrypick source -- and flags the extra rows isaux=1; we only ever diffed against the primary parent. add_mlink is now ported whole (internal/manifest/addmlink.go), which also brings the two passes the old code approximated: the delta-vs-delta revert/resurrect pass, and the baseline-child deletion pass with its mperm=0 delete rows. "Added by merge" (pid=-1) follows canonical's rule too -- a count over the rows a file produced, not a name lookup in the merge parents. A parent whose manifest cannot be read now yields NO rows rather than a whole tree of bogus "added" rows, and the rows are derived later from the parent's side once it arrives (linkPlinkChildren), so the result no longer depends on the order the sweep visits artifacts in.

tagxref, -612 of -632. A check-in's T-card does not have to name the check-in carrying it: `fossil merge --integrate` records the branch it closed as `T +closed <hash>` on the merge check-in itself. Canonical applies a check-in's, a control artifact's and a technote's T-cards through one code path; we applied only the self-referential ones on check-ins and none at all on technotes.

tagxref, the rest. A wiki-

or event-<id> tag's value is the W-card body measured after LEADING whitespace is skipped, not the raw card length.

Artifact identification. The sweep parses every blob in the repository, so what counts as an artifact decides which rows exist at all. Three gaps: a bare card letter with no arguments is legal (fossil's own first check-in spells its parentless-ness as a bare "P" card) and rejecting it dropped that check-in entirely; an N-card after a P-card is legal in a technote for historical compatibility, and rejecting it dropped real technote revisions with their event-<id> and bgcolor tags; and the check-in-versus-control decision turns on a comment, files or parents, which made `merge --integrate` check-ins read as control artifacts. Fossil's required-card table now gates linking (isArtifact), on both the sweep and the dephantomize cascade, so a file whose first line parses as a Z-card no longer links as a dateless check-in and a wiki revision missing its U-card no longer links at all.

plink, -5. The ancestry a check-in declares is a property of the check-in, not of what happens to be in the repository when it is crosslinked. A parent hash with no blob yet now reserves a phantom the way canonical's uuid_to_rid does, so the edge exists whether the parent arrives in a later round or never; skipping it lost the edge for good, because nothing revisits an already-linked artifact.

leaf, -1. Nothing calls leaf_rebuild() outside `fossil leaves --recompute`; the table is maintained by leaf_check() over the rids leaf_eventually_check() schedules -- each rid a branch tag lands on, plus that rid's parents. Drawing candidates from event instead both missed phantom parents (which fossil does list) and added check-ins that carry no branch tag and no ancestry (which it does not).

After: a fresh corpus clone and `fossil rebuild` of that clone agree row for row on mlink, plink, tagxref, leaf AND event -- 104,919 / 23,741 / 51,766 / 1,426 / 27,099 either way, and `fossil test-integrity` reports 0 errors.

Not addressed here: the local commit path (manifest.insertMlinks) still writes one mlink row per file rather than per change, and does not record merge-parent transitions. That is a separate divergence from the clone parity this issue is about.

Co-authored-by: Dan Mestas <[email protected]>

check-in: 5e6ef35173 user: [email protected] tags: trunk
01:50
perf: stop the post-sync crosslink sweep re-examining the whole repository (#202) (#210)

A pull into an already-up-to-date clone of the Fossil SCM repository took 2m44s and moved nothing. A CPU profile of that no-op pull puts 134.4s of 149.1s of samples (90%) inside manifest.CrosslinkContext, the whole-repository sweep Sync runs after the round loop. Nothing in the protocol path registers.

Two independent costs, both O(repository size) and neither bounded by what arrived:

collectCrosslinkCandidates 99.5s (67%) linkBatch -> Cache.Expand 34.9s (23%) of which hash.SHA3 26.0s (17%)

The query was quadratic. Its four exclusions were correlated NOT EXISTS subqueries, and tagxref is indexed on (rid, tagid) and (tagid, mtime) -- neither covers srcid -- so SQLite rescanned all 51,134 tagxref rows once per blob, 67,615 times. EXPLAIN QUERY PLAN showed the CORRELATED SCALAR SUBQUERY -> SCAN tx. Rewritten as NOT IN, each set materializes once and is probed: identical 39,727 rows, 47.7s -> 0.08s measured under canonical fossil's SQLite.

The candidate set never shrank. A blob qualifies when it has none of the derived rows a crosslink writes, and ordinary file content never gains those rows however often it is examined -- so 39,727 of the repository's 67,615 blobs were re-expanded (delta chain walked, SHA3 re-verified) and re-parsed on every sync. A probe run confirms the sweep linked exactly 0 artifacts on each of two consecutive runs over the converged repository, at 3m20s and 3m15s.

Canonical fossil has no equivalent cost because it never sweeps: xfer.c attempts one crosslink per blob as it arrives, artifact or not. This gives the sweep the same once-per-blob property via crosslink_nonartifact, an on-demand table recording blobs that expanded but hold no parseable artifact. Both facts are properties of immutable blob content, so the verdict cannot go stale; a blob that failed to expand, or that parsed but was deferred, is deliberately not recorded and is reconsidered next sweep.

Measured on a clone of the Fossil SCM repository (67,615 blobs), no-op pull:

before 2m43.9s after 0.40s

Clone is unchanged at 5m30s (it pays the one-time examination either way), and the two clones' derived tables are identical -- blob, event, mlink, plink, tagxref, filename and leaf totals all match row for row.

Fixes #202 check-in: 3748b95de7 user: [email protected] tags: trunk

00:44
fix: make authenticated sync interoperate with canonical fossil (#207)

* fix: make authenticated sync interoperate with canonical fossil (#203)

Every credentialed sync against a real fossil server was answered "login failed", whether or not the password was right. Push always needs a login, so push was unusable against any real server, as was pull from anything that did not grant anonymous read.

The login algorithm was never the problem. Two wire-level defects were, and each on its own produces that identical, password-independent rejection.

The push and pull cards carried their two codes in the wrong order. The canonical form is `push SERVERCODE PROJECTCODE` — canonical's own client writes `blob_appendf(&send, "push %s %s\n", zSCode, zPCode)` and both ends read the project code out of the second argument (src/xfer.c). We emitted and parsed project code first. A clone therefore adopted the server's server-code as its project code, and since a login signature is salted with the project code, every signature was derived from the wrong value. The same inversion put the server code where a server validates the project code, so an authenticated push was refused with "wrong project" even once the login worked.

The nonce covered a random comment that was never transmitted. The nonce is the hash of every byte following the login card, and the server re-hashes those bytes to check it (src/xfer.c check_tail_hash) — so the comment supplying the randomness has to be on the wire, not merely in the hash. We appended it to the hashed payload only, producing a nonce the server could not reproduce; it rejected the login before comparing the password at all, which is why a wrong password looked exactly like a right one. Comment lines now have a card type, so they can be sent as well as hashed.

Two smaller faults on the same path: a clone treated the server's round-0 "not authorized to clone" as fatal, ending the session before credentials were ever offered, where canonical tolerates that error on the first cycle precisely so the client can retry with the login card it can only build once it knows the project code; and the sync path signed with SyncOpts.ProjectCode rather than the code it had already resolved from the repository, so a caller that let the repo supply its project code — as the push and pull cards allow — panicked instead of authenticating.

The password derivation itself, sha1("<project-code>/<login>/<password>"), was correct and is unchanged. It is now pinned two ways: against the hash the fossil binary actually stores in user.pw, and against a login card captured from fossil 2.28 on the wire. Canonical's rule that an already hashed 40-hex password is used as-is is now honoured too.

Regression coverage stands up a canonical fossil server with anonymous capabilities removed, so a login card is the only way in, and asserts that a credentialed clone transfers content, a wrong password is refused, and a local commit pushed under authentication lands in the server's blob table and on its timeline. Nothing in the suite authenticated against real fossil before; clone was only ever exercised against servers granting anonymous read, where the login card is never sent, which is how this shipped.

Four xfer codec expectations that pinned the inverted argument order are corrected to the canonical bytes.

* fix(sync): correct the nonce doc to match what the server recomputes

The comment described the nonce as covering the encoded non-login cards and the signature as using the stored password hash. Both readings are wrong in ways that matter to anyone changing this code: the nonce is defined over the bytes that actually follow the login card on the wire, because the server recomputes it from what it received (src/xfer.c check_tail_hash), and the signature is salted with the project code rather than derived from user.pw directly. Hashing bytes the message does not carry produces a nonce the peer cannot reproduce, which is exactly the password-independent rejection this fix was chasing. check-in: a745f4f2ac user: [email protected] tags: trunk

00:27
refactor(tag): give the three tag-apply paths one propagation helper (#209)

AddTag, ApplyTag and ApplyTagWithTx each carried their own copy of the same type guard and eight-argument propagate call. #198 had to apply its mtime guard to all three, and a fourth site -- or one site updated while the others are missed -- reproduces exactly the shape that produced #197 (leaf derived two different ways) and #199 (project code resolved two different ways).

Extract propagateAfterInsert so the guard travels with the propagation instead of being restated at each caller, and cover the consolidated path. check-in: 4806de7907 user: [email protected] tags: trunk

00:18
fix: stop tag propagation from crossing branch boundaries (#198) (#206)

Branch tag propagation left 1,155 of 20,859 check-ins on a clone of the fossil repository carrying a different branch value than canonical, and tagxref at 68,883 rows against canonical's 51,764. Two independent defects in the port, both confirmed against fossil's own source and a canonical rebuild of the same blobs.

tag_insert is mtime-guarded and our tag application was not. Canonical opens it with

SELECT 1 FROM tagxref WHERE tagid=%d AND rid=%d AND mtime>=:mtime

and returns without touching tagxref -- and without calling tag_propagate -- when it matches (src/tag.c:173-186). AddTag, ApplyTag and ApplyTagWithTx all wrote unconditionally, so a check-in's own inline T-cards clobbered a later control artifact that had retagged the same check-in, then re-propagated the stale value to every descendant. On the real corpus one branch rename did this 19,115 times: check-in ab0a0d76 declares branch dual-license, three control artifacts later rename it to clear-title, and we reinstated dual-license and flooded the repository with it. The guard makes the outcome independent of the order the sweep visits the two artifacts in.

repairTagPropagation seeded from the wrong node. tag_propagate's per-child test is strict --

coalesce(srcid=0 AND tagxref.mtime<:mtime, 1) AS doit

-- so a descendant that already carries the tag holds it at exactly the origin's mtime, doit is 0, and the walk neither retags that child nor queues it. Replaying from tag origins therefore stopped dead at the first already-tagged descendant, stranding any check-in linked by a later sweep. Canonical seeds from the primary parent instead, right after inserting a new check-in's plink edges (src/manifest.c:2300-2302 and 2467-2469), which only ever tests that parent's own children. Seed from every primary parent, which is the sweep-order-independent equivalent. Worth 693 missing propagated branch rows.

Measured on a clone of the fossil repository against a canonical rebuild of the same blobs:

divergent branch values 1,155 -> 1 (of 20,858 compared) tagxref rows 68,883 -> 51,132 (canonical 51,764) leaf rows 1,463 -> 1,425 (canonical 1,426)

The residual 632-row tagxref gap is 613 missing `closed` singletons plus small change; it measures identically before and after this change and is a separate defect. The one remaining divergent branch value is a NULL-vs-empty-string difference in cancel-tag values, also pre-existing.

repairTagPropagation still runs before repairLeafTable, as #197 requires. check-in: 7043d6e3a9 user: [email protected] tags: trunk

2026-07-27
23:37
ci: gate the js/wasm build on every PR (#201) (#205)

test.yml had zero references to wasm or GOOS=js, so the WebAssembly build was never compiled on any leg. Browser support is the reason the ncruces driver is in the tree, and a break there would have shipped undetected -- including in db/config_wasm.go, whose js-tagged wasmPragmaOverrides() no job compiled at all.

Adds a build-only job covering 31 of the main module's 33 js-resolvable packages plus the ncruces driver submodule. The package set comes from go list rather than a hand-written list so new packages are gated by default. Two main packages are excluded, both for the same structural reason: cmd/libfossil and examples/embed-repo-api import the modernc driver directly in their own main.go, and modernc.org/libc has no js/wasm build. internal/stash and internal/undo declare //go:build !js in source and are dropped by go list itself. Building under -tags test_ncruces keeps internal/testdriver in the gate by pointing it at the driver that can actually target WASM.

Running tests under WASM needs a browser harness (wasmbrowsertest) and is deliberately out of scope; compilation catches the realistic failure mode. check-in: 10abca922c user: [email protected] tags: trunk

23:31
fix(sync): derive the project code, and write artifact visibility inside the storing transaction (#204)

* fix(sync): derive the project code from the repo instead of panicking (#199)

Supplying User/Password made SyncOpts.ProjectCode mandatory in practice: buildLoginCard passed the caller's raw value straight to computeLogin, which asserts it is non-empty, so an authenticated Sync on a repo whose project code the caller had not repeated took the process down. Nothing in the public API signalled that a password made the field required, and a server embedding the library died with it.

buildRequest already fell back to the repo's stored project-code for the push/pull cards; that fallback was local to one function, which is exactly how the login path drifted out of step with it. Resolve the code once when the session is built — caller value first, the repo's own config second — and let buildRequest and buildLoginCard both read it. A code that genuinely cannot be determined now returns a descriptive error from the site that needs it rather than panicking.

Sync's deferred result-not-nil assertion fired during panic unwinding, where err and result are both nil, replacing the original cause with its own message. The invariant only holds on a normal return, so it no longer asserts while a panic is in flight.

* fix(sync): write received artifacts' visibility inside the storing transaction (#200)

Receiving an artifact cost three write transactions, not one. The blob was stored in a transaction, its dephantomize cascade committed another, and then applyPrivateStatus re-derived the rid on the pool and issued a bare DELETE FROM private -- an implicit transaction of its own, with its own BEGIN IMMEDIATE and fsync, for a row that a transaction microseconds earlier had guaranteed did not exist. Every igot card announcing an artifact already held cost one more. Measured against a real fossil peer: 1509 statements executed outside a transaction to receive 1504 artifacts.

That is minutes of pure commit overhead on a large repository -- roughly 200,000 write transactions for a 67k-artifact pull -- and it is fragile as well as slow. Each of those writes contests the database's single write lock independently, so N artifacts means N chances to lose that contest and fail outright rather than one chance to wait at a single BEGIN.

Visibility now travels with the content it describes: storeReceivedFile takes the visibility a private card announced and records it inside the transaction that stores the blob, using the rid that transaction already has. The status is now atomic with the content rather than a separate write that could be interrupted between the two. The igot path buffers its updates and writes them once per round. The same three-transaction shape on the server's receive path goes with it.

The same real-fossil pull now executes 2 statements outside a transaction for those 1504 artifacts, down from 1509. db.DB.PoolExecs makes that budget assertable, which is how the regression test pins O(rounds) rather than O(artifacts) without needing a large corpus.

On the failure originally reported: the "database is locked" error came from a harness that copied a live SQLite database out from under a running server without its WAL, so that specific lock holder is not a product defect and this does not claim to fix it. The transaction storm above is a real performance and robustness defect on its own evidence, and is what this changes.

* test(sync): pin the transaction budget, not just writes outside a transaction

The budget tests measured PoolExecs, which counts statements issued outside a transaction. That pins one half of the defect and misses the other: moving a per-artifact write from the pool into its own WithTx leaves PoolExecs unchanged while every artifact still pays a BEGIN IMMEDIATE and an fsync, and still contests the single write lock on its own. That is the cost issue #200 actually measured -- roughly three write transactions per received file, about 203,000 for one clone-sized pull.

Verified by mutation: reverting the batched visibility flush to one transaction per update left both budget tests green. They now count transactions too, via a new db.DB.WriteTxns counter, and the same mutation fails with "began 51 write transactions for 50 igot cards over 1 rounds; want <= 4".

Also stop the contention test from starving the pull it is meant to observe. The rival connection re-acquired the write lock immediately on release, so on a loaded machine it could hold the pull's single BEGIN past busy_timeout and fail the test even when the batching under test is perfect -- which is what happened on CI. It now yields between bursts, modelling another process doing occasional writes rather than testing SQLite's fairness. check-in: 18bfbc166c user: [email protected] tags: trunk

22:04
fix: derive leaf by canonical's branch rule, in both the sweep and the commit path (#197)

* fix: derive leaf from fossil's branch rule and bound the deferral rollup

Leaf derivation dropped 66% of rows on the real Fossil repository (487 of 1,426) because both leaf paths treated any parent link as retiring a leaf. Canonical fossil retires a check-in only when a child carries the *same* branch name, with an absent branch tag reading as "trunk" (src/leaf.c: is_a_leaf / leaf_check / leaf_rebuild all share that predicate and none consult plink.isprim). Verified against fossil 2.28 itself: after a branch commit off the trunk tip, both the incremental table and `fossil rebuild` keep the trunk tip as a leaf even though its only child is its primary child, and a branch tip merged into trunk stays a leaf as well.

Two code paths were wrong, in the same way:

- repairLeafTable excluded every `pid` in plink, so merged branch tips disappeared -- the class that accounts for 939 of the corpus's leaves. - Checkin deleted every parent from leaf, so committing onto a new branch silently retired the branch point.

Both now share leafCheck/repairLeafTable in internal/manifest/leaf.go. The recompute also has to run after tag propagation rather than before it: a check-in that declares no branch of its own only has a branch value once propagation has written it, and comparing against a missing value made every inherited-branch tip look like a leaf.

Applying the new predicate to the real repository's own event/plink/tagxref yields 1,428 against fossil's 1,426, and every one of the six differing rows is fossil's incremental bookkeeping rather than its predicate: 2 are phantom rids fossil's leaf_check inserts as plink parents of check-ins it linked, and 4 are parentless check-ins with no branch tag, which nothing ever enqueues for a leaf check. Running fossil's own leaf_rebuild() on that repository gives 1,494, so it is leaf_check, not leaf_rebuild, that the shipped table reflects.

Also caps the deferral rollup's identifier lists (issue #194). A clone deferring 180 check-ins on 417 missing blobs rendered a single ~28 KB log line; the counts stay exact at INFO and the lists print eight entries plus an "...and N more" so nothing is dropped without saying so.

Fixes #189 Fixes #194

* chore: retrigger code scanning after branch restore check-in: df495ba69e user: [email protected] tags: trunk

20:03
fix(sync): retry a dropped exchange round instead of aborting the clone (#185) (#196)

A clone of a large repository is a conversation of dozens of rounds spanning minutes. A single transient disconnect anywhere in it aborted the whole operation with "http transport: Post ...: EOF" and produced no store at all: there was no retry, no reconnect, and minutes of transfer were discarded for one dropped packet. Reported failures landed at rounds 6, 11 and 18 across otherwise identical runs, which is the signature of independent random drops rather than a deterministic defect.

Both round loops now send a failed round again after a bounded exponential backoff — four attempts, 250 ms doubling to a 2 s cap — but only when the failure was the network dropping the exchange. The classification is an allow-list, not a deny-list: a reply that arrived whole and would not decode, a card the peer rejected, a 4xx, or an unrecognised error from a Transport this package does not know all still fail on their first occurrence. Retrying those would turn a reproducible defect into an intermittent one, which is worse than the failure retrying exists to prevent.

Telling the two apart cannot be done reliably after the fact — a truncated zlib body and a truncated wire read both surface as io.ErrUnexpectedEOF — so the transports tag their own wire stages via the optional TransportFault interface, in the same shape as FramedTransport. Non-2xx replies are now reported as such instead of being handed to the decoder, which also stops a peer's outage from being misreported as a framing defect.

The caller's context governs throughout: a cancellation or deadline aborts immediately, including during a backoff wait, so retrying cannot extend an operation past the bound its caller set (#166, #167, #183).

Resuming a partially-completed clone across process exit is deliberately not included: it needs the clone cursor persisted, a staleness policy for the server's snapshot bound, and a separate entry point, and within-session retry already preserves the expensive part. check-in: b2928e9629 user: [email protected] tags: trunk

19:57
fix: pin submodules to v0.7.0 instead of an orphaned pseudo-version (#190) (#195)

All three submodules required the root module at v0.6.4-0.20260724230440-48111c1c984d. That pseudo-version names a commit pushed on the #118 PR branch, which was squash-merged — rewriting the work as a new commit and orphaning 48111c1. `git branch -r --contains` finds it on no branch; it survives only in proxy.golang.org's cache.

CI never noticed because it resolves through the proxy. Direct-from-git resolution fails outright:

$ GOMODCACHE=$(mktemp -d) GOWORK=off go mod download github.com/danmestas/go-libfossil go: github.com/danmestas/[email protected]: invalid version: unknown revision 48111c1c984d

v0.7.0 is tagged and reachable, so the bootstrap constraint that forced a pseudo-version is gone. Repoint all three at the tag and tidy. The root go.mod hash is unchanged between the orphaned commit and v0.7.0, so this is a pure provenance fix with no dependency movement.

Add a release guard alongside the existing `replace` guard: any in-repo module required at a pseudo-version now fails the release before the tag ships. The pattern anchors on the 14-digit timestamp and 12-hex hash, and accepts either separator before the timestamp so the vX.Y.Z-0.<ts>-<hash> form is caught as well as v0.0.0-<ts>-<hash>. Third-party pseudo-versions such as ncruces/go-sqlite3-wasm are deliberately untouched. check-in: 9d35407ecb user: [email protected] tags: trunk

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