This Day In History For 2027-07-28
1 Year Ago (more context)
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2026-07-28
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| 22:08 |
fix(manifest): unify mlink derivation (#216)
Route direct check-ins and internal rebuilds through canonical mlink derivation. Update sparse-history consumers and preserve legacy conflict-fork rows with an explicit RID discriminator migration.\n\nCloses #213 check-in: 04f41a4c9c user: [email protected] tags: trunk | |
| 04:03 |
perf: stop clone re-seeking blob.uuid per F-card and over-allocating delta output (#187) (#212)
Cloning the Fossil SCM corpus (67.6k blobs) took 293-302 s at 1251-1287 MB against canonical fossil's 20.8 s at 205 MB. A CPU and allocation profile of one clone found the cost was not delta expansion or hash verification. 27.2% of all CPU was a single un-memoized statement. content.AvailabilityCache memoizes the delta-chain walk but not the "SELECT rid FROM blob WHERE uuid=?" that starts it, so manifest.missingCheckinRefs re-seeked the blob.uuid index once per F-card of every check-in -- the same file hash resolved again for every revision that did not change it. That index is far larger than SQLite's page cache, so each seek was three page reads: pread syscalls were 34.7% of total samples. The walk it guards was under 1% of its own cost. Separately, materializing 8.27 GB of content allocated 360 GB. delta.ApplyInto starts at a 64 KiB cap deliberately -- the target length is a wire claim and a few bytes can declare 4 GiB -- and then climbs to the real size through append's ~1.25x large-slice growth, ~3.4x the target in discarded intermediates, leaving slack that content.Cache.clip copied away again (203.9 GB and 59.8 GB respectively). Three changes: - Memoize uuid -> rid in AvailabilityCache. Hits only. Within one crosslink run a hit cannot go stale, because a sweep and a cascade only ever add blob rows; a miss can, because ridOrPhantom and blob.StorePhantom create rows mid-run, and remembering an absence would leave an artifact deferred after the content it waits on arrived. The scope that makes this sound is now stated on the type, and TestAvailabilityCacheMustNotSpanAPurge pins its one boundary: shun.Purge deletes blob rows, so a cache must not span one. - Size delta.ApplyInto's output exactly. scanOutputSize walks the command stream first without allocating, checking every copy against bytes the source holds and every insert against bytes the delta carries, so the size it returns is a measurement rather than the header's claim. Any stream it cannot walk to a clean terminator falls back to the existing growth path, so malformed and hostile deltas allocate and fail exactly as before. The buffer now arrives tightly sized, which also makes clip's copy a no-op. - Cut crosslinkCacheBytes from 256 to 128 MiB. Each byte of that budget costs roughly five bytes of peak RSS -- GOGC doubles it into the heap goal, and the scavenger is paced off GC cycles, of which a faster sweep runs fewer. At 256 MiB the first two changes gave 205.7 s but 1473 MB, faster at the cost of memory. The measured curve (32/64/128/256 MiB: 369.6 s/318 MB, 292.3 s/447 MB, 249.4 s/812 MB, 205.7 s/1473 MB) puts 128 MiB where both axes improve. Result on the same corpus: 245.4 s at 780 MB, from 293-302 s at 1251-1287 MB -- 17% less wall time and 39% less peak RSS, with instructions retired down from 3.37T to 2.48T. The gap to canonical narrows from 14.1x/6.3x to 11.8x/3.8x. Derived tables are unchanged against an unmodified build cloning the same server: blob 67530, event 27099 (identical per type), mlink 104919, plink 23741, tagxref 51766, leaf 1426, filename 1496. The corpus parity gate passes. What remains is structural rather than a missing optimization: a clone expands every blob twice, once in the receive-time phantom-fill cascade and once in the final whole-repository sweep, where canonical crosslinks each artifact from content it already holds in hand at receive time. Cache.Expand splits 45.4 s / 35.3 s across those two passes. Collapsing them is a change to the receive path and belongs in its own issue. check-in: 8b16c91f5c user: [email protected] tags: trunk | |
| 02:35 |
fix: derive mlink, plink, tagxref and leaf the way canonical fossil does (#193) (#211)
A full clone of the Fossil self-hosting repository disagreed with what canonical fossil derives from the SAME artifacts: mlink -3,351 rows, tagxref -632, plink -5, leaf -1. `fossil rebuild` on our own clone put every one of them back, so the artifact set was complete and the fault was entirely in crosslink-time derivation. Six independent causes, each verified against `fossil rebuild` on a 67.6k-blob corpus clone: mlink, -3,351. An mlink row records a parent-to-child TRANSITION, and a merge check-in has more than one parent. Canonical runs the same file-level diff once per parent -- primary, then each merge parent, then each cherrypick source -- and flags the extra rows isaux=1; we only ever diffed against the primary parent. add_mlink is now ported whole (internal/manifest/addmlink.go), which also brings the two passes the old code approximated: the delta-vs-delta revert/resurrect pass, and the baseline-child deletion pass with its mperm=0 delete rows. "Added by merge" (pid=-1) follows canonical's rule too -- a count over the rows a file produced, not a name lookup in the merge parents. A parent whose manifest cannot be read now yields NO rows rather than a whole tree of bogus "added" rows, and the rows are derived later from the parent's side once it arrives (linkPlinkChildren), so the result no longer depends on the order the sweep visits artifacts in. tagxref, -612 of -632. A check-in's T-card does not have to name the check-in carrying it: `fossil merge --integrate` records the branch it closed as `T +closed <hash>` on the merge check-in itself. Canonical applies a check-in's, a control artifact's and a technote's T-cards through one code path; we applied only the self-referential ones on check-ins and none at all on technotes. tagxref, the rest. A wiki- or event-<id> tag's value is the W-card body measured after LEADING whitespace is skipped, not the raw card length.Artifact identification. The sweep parses every blob in the repository, so what counts as an artifact decides which rows exist at all. Three gaps: a bare card letter with no arguments is legal (fossil's own first check-in spells its parentless-ness as a bare "P" card) and rejecting it dropped that check-in entirely; an N-card after a P-card is legal in a technote for historical compatibility, and rejecting it dropped real technote revisions with their event-<id> and bgcolor tags; and the check-in-versus-control decision turns on a comment, files or parents, which made `merge --integrate` check-ins read as control artifacts. Fossil's required-card table now gates linking (isArtifact), on both the sweep and the dephantomize cascade, so a file whose first line parses as a Z-card no longer links as a dateless check-in and a wiki revision missing its U-card no longer links at all. plink, -5. The ancestry a check-in declares is a property of the check-in, not of what happens to be in the repository when it is crosslinked. A parent hash with no blob yet now reserves a phantom the way canonical's uuid_to_rid does, so the edge exists whether the parent arrives in a later round or never; skipping it lost the edge for good, because nothing revisits an already-linked artifact. leaf, -1. Nothing calls leaf_rebuild() outside `fossil leaves --recompute`; the table is maintained by leaf_check() over the rids leaf_eventually_check() schedules -- each rid a branch tag lands on, plus that rid's parents. Drawing candidates from event instead both missed phantom parents (which fossil does list) and added check-ins that carry no branch tag and no ancestry (which it does not). After: a fresh corpus clone and `fossil rebuild` of that clone agree row for row on mlink, plink, tagxref, leaf AND event -- 104,919 / 23,741 / 51,766 / 1,426 / 27,099 either way, and `fossil test-integrity` reports 0 errors. Not addressed here: the local commit path (manifest.insertMlinks) still writes one mlink row per file rather than per change, and does not record merge-parent transitions. That is a separate divergence from the clone parity this issue is about. Co-authored-by: Dan Mestas <[email protected]> check-in: 5e6ef35173 user: [email protected] tags: trunk | |
| 01:50 |
perf: stop the post-sync crosslink sweep re-examining the whole repository (#202) (#210)
A pull into an already-up-to-date clone of the Fossil SCM repository took 2m44s and moved nothing. A CPU profile of that no-op pull puts 134.4s of 149.1s of samples (90%) inside manifest.CrosslinkContext, the whole-repository sweep Sync runs after the round loop. Nothing in the protocol path registers. Two independent costs, both O(repository size) and neither bounded by what arrived: collectCrosslinkCandidates 99.5s (67%) linkBatch -> Cache.Expand 34.9s (23%) of which hash.SHA3 26.0s (17%) The query was quadratic. Its four exclusions were correlated NOT EXISTS subqueries, and tagxref is indexed on (rid, tagid) and (tagid, mtime) -- neither covers srcid -- so SQLite rescanned all 51,134 tagxref rows once per blob, 67,615 times. EXPLAIN QUERY PLAN showed the CORRELATED SCALAR SUBQUERY -> SCAN tx. Rewritten as NOT IN, each set materializes once and is probed: identical 39,727 rows, 47.7s -> 0.08s measured under canonical fossil's SQLite. The candidate set never shrank. A blob qualifies when it has none of the derived rows a crosslink writes, and ordinary file content never gains those rows however often it is examined -- so 39,727 of the repository's 67,615 blobs were re-expanded (delta chain walked, SHA3 re-verified) and re-parsed on every sync. A probe run confirms the sweep linked exactly 0 artifacts on each of two consecutive runs over the converged repository, at 3m20s and 3m15s. Canonical fossil has no equivalent cost because it never sweeps: xfer.c attempts one crosslink per blob as it arrives, artifact or not. This gives the sweep the same once-per-blob property via crosslink_nonartifact, an on-demand table recording blobs that expanded but hold no parseable artifact. Both facts are properties of immutable blob content, so the verdict cannot go stale; a blob that failed to expand, or that parsed but was deferred, is deliberately not recorded and is reconsidered next sweep. Measured on a clone of the Fossil SCM repository (67,615 blobs), no-op pull: before 2m43.9s after 0.40s Clone is unchanged at 5m30s (it pays the one-time examination either way), and the two clones' derived tables are identical -- blob, event, mlink, plink, tagxref, filename and leaf totals all match row for row. Fixes #202 check-in: 3748b95de7 user: [email protected] tags: trunk | |
| 00:44 |
fix: make authenticated sync interoperate with canonical fossil (#207)
* fix: make authenticated sync interoperate with canonical fossil (#203) Every credentialed sync against a real fossil server was answered "login failed", whether or not the password was right. Push always needs a login, so push was unusable against any real server, as was pull from anything that did not grant anonymous read. The login algorithm was never the problem. Two wire-level defects were, and each on its own produces that identical, password-independent rejection. The push and pull cards carried their two codes in the wrong order. The canonical form is `push SERVERCODE PROJECTCODE` — canonical's own client writes `blob_appendf(&send, "push %s %s\n", zSCode, zPCode)` and both ends read the project code out of the second argument (src/xfer.c). We emitted and parsed project code first. A clone therefore adopted the server's server-code as its project code, and since a login signature is salted with the project code, every signature was derived from the wrong value. The same inversion put the server code where a server validates the project code, so an authenticated push was refused with "wrong project" even once the login worked. The nonce covered a random comment that was never transmitted. The nonce is the hash of every byte following the login card, and the server re-hashes those bytes to check it (src/xfer.c check_tail_hash) — so the comment supplying the randomness has to be on the wire, not merely in the hash. We appended it to the hashed payload only, producing a nonce the server could not reproduce; it rejected the login before comparing the password at all, which is why a wrong password looked exactly like a right one. Comment lines now have a card type, so they can be sent as well as hashed. Two smaller faults on the same path: a clone treated the server's round-0 "not authorized to clone" as fatal, ending the session before credentials were ever offered, where canonical tolerates that error on the first cycle precisely so the client can retry with the login card it can only build once it knows the project code; and the sync path signed with SyncOpts.ProjectCode rather than the code it had already resolved from the repository, so a caller that let the repo supply its project code — as the push and pull cards allow — panicked instead of authenticating. The password derivation itself, sha1("<project-code>/<login>/<password>"), was correct and is unchanged. It is now pinned two ways: against the hash the fossil binary actually stores in user.pw, and against a login card captured from fossil 2.28 on the wire. Canonical's rule that an already hashed 40-hex password is used as-is is now honoured too. Regression coverage stands up a canonical fossil server with anonymous capabilities removed, so a login card is the only way in, and asserts that a credentialed clone transfers content, a wrong password is refused, and a local commit pushed under authentication lands in the server's blob table and on its timeline. Nothing in the suite authenticated against real fossil before; clone was only ever exercised against servers granting anonymous read, where the login card is never sent, which is how this shipped. Four xfer codec expectations that pinned the inverted argument order are corrected to the canonical bytes. * fix(sync): correct the nonce doc to match what the server recomputes The comment described the nonce as covering the encoded non-login cards and the signature as using the stored password hash. Both readings are wrong in ways that matter to anyone changing this code: the nonce is defined over the bytes that actually follow the login card on the wire, because the server recomputes it from what it received (src/xfer.c check_tail_hash), and the signature is salted with the project code rather than derived from user.pw directly. Hashing bytes the message does not carry produces a nonce the peer cannot reproduce, which is exactly the password-independent rejection this fix was chasing. check-in: a745f4f2ac user: [email protected] tags: trunk | |
| 00:27 |
refactor(tag): give the three tag-apply paths one propagation helper (#209)
AddTag, ApplyTag and ApplyTagWithTx each carried their own copy of the same type guard and eight-argument propagate call. #198 had to apply its mtime guard to all three, and a fourth site -- or one site updated while the others are missed -- reproduces exactly the shape that produced #197 (leaf derived two different ways) and #199 (project code resolved two different ways). Extract propagateAfterInsert so the guard travels with the propagation instead of being restated at each caller, and cover the consolidated path. check-in: 4806de7907 user: [email protected] tags: trunk | |
| 00:18 |
fix: stop tag propagation from crossing branch boundaries (#198) (#206)
Branch tag propagation left 1,155 of 20,859 check-ins on a clone of the fossil repository carrying a different branch value than canonical, and tagxref at 68,883 rows against canonical's 51,764. Two independent defects in the port, both confirmed against fossil's own source and a canonical rebuild of the same blobs. tag_insert is mtime-guarded and our tag application was not. Canonical opens it with SELECT 1 FROM tagxref WHERE tagid=%d AND rid=%d AND mtime>=:mtime and returns without touching tagxref -- and without calling tag_propagate -- when it matches (src/tag.c:173-186). AddTag, ApplyTag and ApplyTagWithTx all wrote unconditionally, so a check-in's own inline T-cards clobbered a later control artifact that had retagged the same check-in, then re-propagated the stale value to every descendant. On the real corpus one branch rename did this 19,115 times: check-in ab0a0d76 declares branch dual-license, three control artifacts later rename it to clear-title, and we reinstated dual-license and flooded the repository with it. The guard makes the outcome independent of the order the sweep visits the two artifacts in. repairTagPropagation seeded from the wrong node. tag_propagate's per-child test is strict -- coalesce(srcid=0 AND tagxref.mtime<:mtime, 1) AS doit -- so a descendant that already carries the tag holds it at exactly the origin's mtime, doit is 0, and the walk neither retags that child nor queues it. Replaying from tag origins therefore stopped dead at the first already-tagged descendant, stranding any check-in linked by a later sweep. Canonical seeds from the primary parent instead, right after inserting a new check-in's plink edges (src/manifest.c:2300-2302 and 2467-2469), which only ever tests that parent's own children. Seed from every primary parent, which is the sweep-order-independent equivalent. Worth 693 missing propagated branch rows. Measured on a clone of the fossil repository against a canonical rebuild of the same blobs: divergent branch values 1,155 -> 1 (of 20,858 compared) tagxref rows 68,883 -> 51,132 (canonical 51,764) leaf rows 1,463 -> 1,425 (canonical 1,426) The residual 632-row tagxref gap is 613 missing `closed` singletons plus small change; it measures identically before and after this change and is a separate defect. The one remaining divergent branch value is a NULL-vs-empty-string difference in cancel-tag values, also pre-existing. repairTagPropagation still runs before repairLeafTable, as #197 requires. check-in: 7043d6e3a9 user: [email protected] tags: trunk | |