Artifact 0d41470e4f2369afe22129f60645925c422453ac390411d8d3147b69168e75d1:
- File
internal/sync/clone.go
— part of check-in
[a745f4f2ac]
at
2026-07-28 00:44:04
on branch trunk
— fix: make authenticated sync interoperate with canonical fossil (#207)
* fix: make authenticated sync interoperate with canonical fossil (#203)
Every credentialed sync against a real fossil server was answered "login failed", whether or not the password was right. Push always needs a login, so push was unusable against any real server, as was pull from anything that did not grant anonymous read.
The login algorithm was never the problem. Two wire-level defects were, and each on its own produces that identical, password-independent rejection.
The push and pull cards carried their two codes in the wrong order. The canonical form is `push SERVERCODE PROJECTCODE` — canonical's own client writes `blob_appendf(&send, "push %s %s\n", zSCode, zPCode)` and both ends read the project code out of the second argument (src/xfer.c). We emitted and parsed project code first. A clone therefore adopted the server's server-code as its project code, and since a login signature is salted with the project code, every signature was derived from the wrong value. The same inversion put the server code where a server validates the project code, so an authenticated push was refused with "wrong project" even once the login worked.
The nonce covered a random comment that was never transmitted. The nonce is the hash of every byte following the login card, and the server re-hashes those bytes to check it (src/xfer.c check_tail_hash) — so the comment supplying the randomness has to be on the wire, not merely in the hash. We appended it to the hashed payload only, producing a nonce the server could not reproduce; it rejected the login before comparing the password at all, which is why a wrong password looked exactly like a right one. Comment lines now have a card type, so they can be sent as well as hashed.
Two smaller faults on the same path: a clone treated the server's round-0 "not authorized to clone" as fatal, ending the session before credentials were ever offered, where canonical tolerates that error on the first cycle precisely so the client can retry with the login card it can only build once it knows the project code; and the sync path signed with SyncOpts.ProjectCode rather than the code it had already resolved from the repository, so a caller that let the repo supply its project code — as the push and pull cards allow — panicked instead of authenticating.
The password derivation itself, sha1("<project-code>/<login>/<password>"), was correct and is unchanged. It is now pinned two ways: against the hash the fossil binary actually stores in user.pw, and against a login card captured from fossil 2.28 on the wire. Canonical's rule that an already hashed 40-hex password is used as-is is now honoured too.
Regression coverage stands up a canonical fossil server with anonymous capabilities removed, so a login card is the only way in, and asserts that a credentialed clone transfers content, a wrong password is refused, and a local commit pushed under authentication lands in the server's blob table and on its timeline. Nothing in the suite authenticated against real fossil before; clone was only ever exercised against servers granting anonymous read, where the login card is never sent, which is how this shipped.
Four xfer codec expectations that pinned the inverted argument order are corrected to the canonical bytes.
* fix(sync): correct the nonce doc to match what the server recomputes
The comment described the nonce as covering the encoded non-login cards and the signature as using the stored password hash. Both readings are wrong in ways that matter to anyone changing this code: the nonce is defined over the bytes that actually follow the login card on the wire, because the server recomputes it from what it received (src/xfer.c check_tail_hash), and the signature is salted with the project code rather than derived from user.pw directly. Hashing bytes the message does not carry produces a nonce the peer cannot reproduce, which is exactly the password-independent rejection this fix was chasing. (user: [email protected], size: 18633) [annotate] [blame] [check-ins using]
package sync import ( "context" "fmt" "os" "sort" "strings" "github.com/danmestas/go-libfossil/internal/content" "github.com/danmestas/go-libfossil/internal/manifest" "github.com/danmestas/go-libfossil/internal/repo" "github.com/danmestas/go-libfossil/internal/xfer" "github.com/danmestas/go-libfossil/simio" ) // phantomStallSampleSize caps how many missing UUIDs PhantomStallError // carries, so a repository with thousands of phantoms doesn't produce an // unreadable error message. const phantomStallSampleSize = 10 // processResponseCancelCheckStride is how many cards processResponse handles // between context-cancellation checks. One clone batch is processed card by // card with no network wait in between, so without an inner check a cancelled // context would not be observed until the next round begins; the check is // batched to avoid a channel read per card. const processResponseCancelCheckStride = 256 // PhantomStallError reports a clone that stopped making progress while // phantom blobs — content referenced but never received — were still // outstanding. Terminating a stalled clone is correct; reporting it as // success is not, so this is always returned instead of nil in that case. // Count is programmatically reachable so a caller can act on it without // parsing the message. type PhantomStallError struct { Count int // phantom UUIDs still outstanding when the clone stopped Sample []string // up to phantomStallSampleSize lexicographically-smallest of those UUIDs, for diagnosis } func (e *PhantomStallError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("sync.Clone: stalled with %d phantom artifact(s) outstanding, e.g. %s", e.Count, strings.Join(e.Sample, ", ")) } // newPhantomStallError builds a PhantomStallError from the session's current // phantom set. Called only once that set is known to be non-empty. func newPhantomStallError(phantoms map[string]bool) *PhantomStallError { if len(phantoms) == 0 { panic("sync.newPhantomStallError: phantoms must not be empty") } all := make([]string, 0, len(phantoms)) for uuid := range phantoms { all = append(all, uuid) } sort.Strings(all) if len(all) > phantomStallSampleSize { all = all[:phantomStallSampleSize] } return &PhantomStallError{Count: len(phantoms), Sample: all} } // cloneSession holds the mutable state of a running clone. type cloneSession struct { repo *repo.Repo env *simio.Env opts CloneOpts result CloneResult phantoms map[string]bool seqno int projectCode string serverCode string cookie string // server-issued snapshot bound; echoed every round so the // server can scope its blob query to the rid range that existed when the // clone session opened. See cloneCapPrefix in handler.go. obs Observer } // Clone performs a full repository clone from a remote Fossil server. // It creates a new repository at path, runs the clone protocol until // convergence, and returns the opened repo and a result summary. // On error, the partially-created repo file is removed. func Clone(ctx context.Context, path string, t Transport, opts CloneOpts) (r *repo.Repo, result *CloneResult, err error) { if path == "" { panic("sync.Clone: path must not be empty") } if t == nil { panic("sync.Clone: t must not be nil") } env := opts.Env if env == nil { env = simio.RealEnv() } storage := env.Storage if storage == nil { storage = simio.OSStorage{} } // Path must not already exist. if _, statErr := storage.Stat(path); statErr == nil { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: file already exists: %s", path) } user := opts.User if user == "" { user = "setup" } // Create the repository. r, err = repo.CreateWithEnv(path, user, env, "") if err != nil { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: create repo: %w", err) } // Cleanup on error: close repo and remove the file. defer func() { if err != nil { r.Close() if rmErr := storage.Remove(path); rmErr != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "sync.Clone: cleanup failed: %v\n", rmErr) } r = nil } }() // Clear project-code — the server will provide its own. if _, execErr := r.DB().Exec("DELETE FROM config WHERE name='project-code'"); execErr != nil { err = fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: clear project-code: %w", execErr) return } cs := &cloneSession{ repo: r, env: env, opts: opts, seqno: 1, phantoms: make(map[string]bool), } cs.obs = resolveObserver(opts.Observer) cloneResult, cloneErr := cs.run(ctx, t) if cloneErr != nil { // cloneResult is still meaningful on a stall or round-limit error — // callers inspecting the returned result (e.g. BlobsRecvd) alongside // a *PhantomStallError shouldn't see it silently dropped to nil. result = cloneResult err = cloneErr return } // Crosslink: parse received manifests into event/plink/leaf/mlink tables. // Use the ctx-aware variant so a clone deadline can interrupt this // whole-repository sweep, which runs after the round loop and so has no // round boundary of its own to observe cancellation at. linked, xlinkErr := manifest.CrosslinkContext(ctx, r) if xlinkErr != nil { result = cloneResult err = fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: crosslink: %w", xlinkErr) return } cloneResult.ArtifactsLinked = linked return r, cloneResult, nil } // run executes the clone loop. func (cs *cloneSession) run(ctx context.Context, t Transport) (*CloneResult, error) { ctx = cs.obs.Started(ctx, SessionStart{ Operation: "clone", Pull: true, }) prevPhantomCount := -1 for cycle := 0; ; cycle++ { select { case <-ctx.Done(): cs.obs.Completed(ctx, sessionEndFromClone(&cs.result), ctx.Err()) return &cs.result, ctx.Err() default: } if cycle >= MaxRounds { err := fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: exceeded %d rounds", MaxRounds) cs.obs.Completed(ctx, sessionEndFromClone(&cs.result), err) return &cs.result, err } roundCtx := cs.obs.RoundStarted(ctx, cycle) req, err := cs.buildRequest(cycle) if err != nil { cs.obs.RoundCompleted(roundCtx, cycle, RoundStats{}) cs.obs.Completed(ctx, sessionEndFromClone(&cs.result), err) return &cs.result, fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: buildRequest round %d: %w", cycle, err) } resp, err := exchangeWithRetry(ctx, t, req, cs.env.Clock, cs.obs) if err != nil { cs.obs.RoundCompleted(roundCtx, cycle, RoundStats{}) cs.obs.Completed(ctx, sessionEndFromClone(&cs.result), err) return &cs.result, fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: exchange round %d: %w", cycle, err) } recvdBefore := cs.result.BlobsRecvd done, err := cs.processResponse(ctx, cycle, resp) if err != nil { cs.obs.RoundCompleted(roundCtx, cycle, RoundStats{FilesReceived: cs.result.BlobsRecvd - recvdBefore}) cs.obs.Completed(ctx, sessionEndFromClone(&cs.result), err) return &cs.result, fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: process round %d: %w", cycle, err) } cs.result.Rounds = cycle + 1 cs.obs.RoundCompleted(roundCtx, cycle, RoundStats{FilesReceived: cs.result.BlobsRecvd - recvdBefore}) stop, stopErr := cs.checkStop(cycle, done, &prevPhantomCount) if stopErr != nil { cs.obs.Completed(ctx, sessionEndFromClone(&cs.result), stopErr) return &cs.result, stopErr } if stop { break } } cs.result.ProjectCode = cs.projectCode cs.result.ServerCode = cs.serverCode cs.obs.Completed(ctx, sessionEndFromClone(&cs.result), nil) return &cs.result, nil } // checkStop decides whether the clone loop should stop after processing a // round. Convergence needs at least two rounds (cycle >= 1), and only once a // round delivers no new file content (roundDone). *prevPhantomCount tracks // the phantom count observed at the end of the prior round and is updated // in place. // // A non-nil err means the loop is stopping because it stalled with phantoms // still outstanding — the phantom count held steady or grew across a round // that delivered nothing new. That is a failed clone, not a successful one, // even though continuing would only spin forever (see PhantomStallError). func (cs *cloneSession) checkStop(cycle int, roundDone bool, prevPhantomCount *int) (stop bool, err error) { if prevPhantomCount == nil { panic("cloneSession.checkStop: prevPhantomCount must not be nil") } if cycle < 1 { return false, nil } if !roundDone { *prevPhantomCount = len(cs.phantoms) return false, nil } phantomCount := len(cs.phantoms) if cs.seqno <= 0 && phantomCount == 0 { return true, nil } if cs.seqno <= 0 && phantomCount > 0 && phantomCount >= *prevPhantomCount { return true, newPhantomStallError(cs.phantoms) } *prevPhantomCount = phantomCount return false, nil } // sessionEndFromClone builds a SessionEnd from a CloneResult. func sessionEndFromClone(r *CloneResult) SessionEnd { return SessionEnd{ Operation: "clone", Rounds: r.Rounds, FilesRecvd: r.BlobsRecvd, ProjectCode: r.ProjectCode, Errors: r.Messages, } } // buildRequest assembles one outbound xfer message for a clone round. func (cs *cloneSession) buildRequest(cycle int) (*xfer.Message, error) { var cards []xfer.Card // Pragma: client-version (every round) cards = append(cards, &xfer.PragmaCard{ Name: "client-version", Values: []string{"22800", "20260315", "120000"}, }) // Cookie carries the server-captured clone snapshot bound. Echoing it back // every round lets the stateless handler enforce a stable upper rid bound // on its batch query, so a hub that is being written to during a clone // session can't keep extending the queue and prevent convergence. if cs.cookie != "" { cards = append(cards, &xfer.CookieCard{Value: cs.cookie}) } // Clone card — only when seqno > 0 (sequential delivery in progress). // When seqno reaches 0, the server has sent all blobs and the client // switches to gimme-based phantom resolution (matching Fossil xfer.c:2706). if cs.seqno > 0 { version := cs.opts.Version if version <= 0 { version = 3 } // The clone card carries the pagination cursor itself — `clone // VERSION SEQNO`, canonical xfer.c:1553. A clone_seqno card must // never go out from here: it is server-to-client only, canonical's // page_xfer() has no parser for it, and sending one lands in the // server's unknown-card branch as `bad command: clone_seqno N` // (issue #74). cards = append(cards, &xfer.CloneCard{ Version: version, SeqNo: cs.seqno, SeqNoIsDecimal: true, }) } else { // Pull mode for phantom resolution after sequential delivery completes. if cs.projectCode != "" && cs.serverCode != "" { cards = append(cards, &xfer.PullCard{ ServerCode: cs.serverCode, ProjectCode: cs.projectCode, }) } } // Gimme cards for phantoms — only when seqno <= 1 (main transfer done or finishing). if cs.seqno <= 1 { gimmes := make([]string, 0, len(cs.phantoms)) for uuid := range cs.phantoms { gimmes = append(gimmes, uuid) } // BUGGIFY: 5% chance drop the last gimme card. if len(gimmes) > 1 && cs.opts.Buggify != nil && cs.opts.Buggify.Check("clone.buildRequest.dropGimme", 0.05) { gimmes = gimmes[:len(gimmes)-1] } for _, uuid := range gimmes { cards = append(cards, &xfer.GimmeCard{UUID: uuid}) } } // Login card: skip round 0. On round 1+, only if User is set AND projectCode received. if cycle > 0 && cs.opts.User != "" && cs.projectCode != "" { loginCard, signed, err := cs.buildLoginCard(cards) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("clone buildLoginCard: %w", err) } cards = append([]xfer.Card{loginCard}, signed...) } return &xfer.Message{Cards: cards}, nil } // buildLoginCard appends a random comment to cards and computes the login card // over the result. It returns the login card and the card list it signed, which // the caller must send verbatim behind that login card — the server recomputes // the nonce from those bytes. func (cs *cloneSession) buildLoginCard(cards []xfer.Card) (*xfer.LoginCard, []xfer.Card, error) { signed := append(cards[:len(cards):len(cards)], randomComment(cs.env.Rand)) payload, err := encodeCards(signed) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } login := computeLogin(cs.opts.User, cs.opts.Password, cs.projectCode, payload) // BUGGIFY: 5% chance corrupt login nonce to test auth failure recovery. if cs.opts.Buggify != nil && cs.opts.Buggify.Check("clone.buildRequest.badLogin", 0.05) { login.Nonce = "corrupted-nonce" } return login, signed, nil } // processResponse handles all cards in a server response for a clone round. // cycle is that round's 0-based index; round 0 is the one sent before the // project code — and so the login card — is known. Returns true when the round // produced no new file content. func (cs *cloneSession) processResponse(ctx context.Context, cycle int, msg *xfer.Message) (bool, error) { if msg == nil { panic("sync.Clone.processResponse: msg must not be nil") } filesRecvd := 0 for i, card := range msg.Cards { if i%processResponseCancelCheckStride == 0 { select { case <-ctx.Done(): cs.result.BlobsRecvd += filesRecvd return false, ctx.Err() default: } } switch c := card.(type) { case *xfer.PushCard: // Server sends push card with project-code and server-code. if c.ProjectCode != "" && cs.projectCode == "" { cs.projectCode = c.ProjectCode if _, err := cs.repo.DB().Exec( "REPLACE INTO config(name, value) VALUES('project-code', ?)", c.ProjectCode, ); err != nil { return false, fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: store project-code: %w", err) } } if c.ServerCode != "" && cs.serverCode == "" { cs.serverCode = c.ServerCode if _, err := cs.repo.DB().Exec( "REPLACE INTO config(name, value) VALUES('server-code', ?)", c.ServerCode, ); err != nil { return false, fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: store server-code: %w", err) } } case *xfer.FileCard: content := c.Content // BUGGIFY: 2% chance corrupt file content to test hash verification. // Relies on blob.Store verify-before-commit to catch corruption. if cs.opts.Buggify != nil && cs.opts.Buggify.Check("clone.processResponse.corruptHash", 0.02) { corrupted := make([]byte, len(content)) copy(corrupted, content) if len(corrupted) > 0 { corrupted[0] ^= 0xff } content = corrupted } // BUGGIFY: 5% chance skip storing a received file, creating a phantom. if cs.opts.Buggify != nil && cs.opts.Buggify.Check("clone.processResponse.dropFile", 0.05) { filesRecvd++ continue } if err := cs.handleFile(ctx, c.UUID, c.DeltaSrc, content, nil); err != nil { return false, err } filesRecvd++ case *xfer.CFileCard: content := c.Content storedBlob := c.StoredBlob // BUGGIFY: 2% chance corrupt file content to test hash verification. // Relies on blob.Store verify-before-commit to catch corruption. // storedBlob must be dropped alongside content: it decodes to // the *original* bytes, so keeping it would let verbatim // storage quietly mask the corruption this path exists to // exercise, instead of the corrupted content being what gets // hash-checked and stored. if cs.opts.Buggify != nil && cs.opts.Buggify.Check("clone.processResponse.corruptHash", 0.02) { corrupted := make([]byte, len(content)) copy(corrupted, content) if len(corrupted) > 0 { corrupted[0] ^= 0xff } content = corrupted storedBlob = nil } // BUGGIFY: 5% chance skip storing a received file, creating a phantom. if cs.opts.Buggify != nil && cs.opts.Buggify.Check("clone.processResponse.dropFile", 0.05) { filesRecvd++ continue } if err := cs.handleFile(ctx, c.UUID, c.DeltaSrc, content, storedBlob); err != nil { return false, err } filesRecvd++ case *xfer.CloneSeqNoCard: // BUGGIFY: 5% chance ignore completion signal, forcing extra round. if c.SeqNo == 0 && cs.opts.Buggify != nil && cs.opts.Buggify.Check("clone.processResponse.dropSeqNo", 0.05) { continue } // The server owns this cursor; the client only reads it. A // non-decimal NEXT never reaches here — the decoder withholds it // per §8.2 so the recorded sequence stays unchanged — and §8.2 // bars the client from validating that a positive value advances. cs.seqno = c.SeqNo case *xfer.ErrorCard: // A clone's first round carries no login card: the signature is // salted with the project code, and the project code is exactly // what this round exists to learn. A server that requires // authentication therefore answers round 0 with its push card — // which supplies that code — followed by "not authorized to // clone". Treating that as fatal ends the clone before the // credentials are ever offered, so round 0 records the message and // carries on; round 1 repeats the request with a login card, and // an error there (a genuinely wrong password, say) is fatal. // Canonical does the same: `(syncFlags & SYNC_CLONE)==0 || // nCycle>0` guards the abort in xfer.c client_sync. if cycle == 0 { cs.result.Messages = append(cs.result.Messages, c.Message) continue } return false, fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: server error: %s", c.Message) case *xfer.CookieCard: cs.cookie = c.Value case *xfer.MessageCard: cs.result.Messages = append(cs.result.Messages, c.Message) } } cs.result.BlobsRecvd += filesRecvd return filesRecvd == 0, nil } // handleFile stores a received file. storeReceivedFile now persists a // delta whose base hasn't arrived yet rather than discarding it (see // storeDeltaAgainstPhantomBase), so uuid itself is never re-requested here // once stored — only a still-missing base might need another round. // // storedBlob, when non-nil, is payload already re-expressed in Fossil's // on-disk blob format (see xfer.CFileCard.StoredBlob) and is persisted // verbatim rather than recompressed — this is what makes a clone // byte-identical to its source's blob table, not merely content-identical. func (cs *cloneSession) handleFile(ctx context.Context, uuid, deltaSrc string, payload []byte, storedBlob []byte) error { if err := storeReceivedFile(ctx, cs.repo, uuid, deltaSrc, payload, storedBlob, visibilityPublic); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("sync.Clone: handleFile %s: %w", uuid, err) } delete(cs.phantoms, uuid) if deltaSrc != "" { // Availability, not existence: a phantom row for deltaSrc still // needs requesting, and so does a delta whose own base is a // phantom. if _, available := content.AvailableByUUID(cs.repo.DB(), deltaSrc); !available { cs.phantoms[deltaSrc] = true } } return nil }