Artifact f39ff7515c3a0de525d463fe6c62ed8b4672137325fcb529e85667d0e7656b46:
- File
internal/delta/delta.go
— part of check-in
[89535a6c42]
at
2026-07-19 18:28:45
on branch trunk
— fix: store delta content against a phantomized base instead of discarding it (#83)
* fix: store delta content against a phantomized base instead of discarding it
A delta artifact arriving before its base is normal steady-state behavior during a Fossil transfer, not a fault. The receive path used to discard such deltas outright and phantomize the target instead, so a phantom only ever cleared when its base happened to already be present -- resolution advanced one delta-chain hop per round, making clones of deep-history repos provably unable to converge within MaxRounds.
Match canonical Fossil's content_put_ex/rid_from_uuid model: resolve the delta's source via a create-phantom-if-missing lookup, persist the delta bytes unconditionally (reading the target size straight out of the delta header, so the base never needs to be readable to store it), and record the delta-to-source link immediately. Availability resolves lazily via the existing content.IsAvailable chain walk and manifest.Crosslink's deferred retry -- both already correct and untouched here.
storeReceivedFile is the single call site shared by clone, sync-pull, and server-push, so fixing it here also closes out the delta-before-base sentinel handling on the pull and push paths (issue #57, folded into this fix): neither path needs to special-case the condition anymore because it stops being an error.
Verified against the pikchr corpus via a loopback fossil server: rounds dropped from 100 (exhausted) to 3, files received from 63,155 (22.2x) to 2,980 (1.05x), and the phantom table empties out completely.
* fix: converge delta storage on canonical, close integrity gap, harden wire parsing
Three defects from review, all in the raw-delta path added for the delta-before-base fix, all reachable from an untrusted peer:
1. delta.getInt accumulated v = v*64 + digit with no overflow check. A twelve-byte header of maximum-value digits wraps to exactly math.MaxUint64, which casts to int64(-1) -- the same sentinel blob.size uses for "phantom". That silently corrupted the row: real content reporting as a phantom, with no phantom-table entry to make it re-requestable. getInt now rejects overflow instead of wrapping, and parseTargetLen (shared by Apply and OutputSize) bounds the parsed target length to a sane maximum before it ever reaches an allocation or a size column.
2. StoreDeltaRaw panicked on a zero-length delta payload. storeReceivedFile guarded payload == nil but not len(payload) == 0, and nothing between wire decode and storage checked for it -- a peer sending an empty delta file card crashed the process. Wire data gets an error return, not an assertion; OutputSize and StoreDeltaRaw are now consistent with delta.Apply's existing "empty delta is an error" contract.
3. The receive-time split (store raw only when the base happens to be unavailable, otherwise eagerly expand and verify) left a gap an attacker chooses the timing of: withhold the base, and a delta claiming any UUID goes down the unverified raw path. Nothing downstream checked it either -- content.Expand applied deltas with no hash check, and content.Verify was reachable only from repo rebuild and one integration test.
Closed by converging fully on canonical's model: every delta is now stored raw and linked via a create-phantom-if-missing lookup, regardless of whether its base is currently available -- receive time no longer branches on availability at all. Verification moves to the one choke point every expansion path already goes through: content.Expand now hashes its result against the row's claimed UUID before returning it, catching a mismatch regardless of which caller or how the chain assembled. content.Verify becomes a thin wrapper over the same check.
Storage-layer and end-to-end regression tests added for all three, including the exact claim-one-UUID/ship-a-delta-for-another/withhold-the- base reproduction, guarded against degenerating into a no-op (delta must actually compress, base must be genuinely absent, rejection must be a real error rather than merely different bytes).
Re-verified against pikchr (2,842 artifacts) and wapp (1,039): pikchr converges in 3 rounds, 2,980 files, 0 phantoms; wapp converges in 3 rounds, 1,115 files, 1 phantom outstanding (pre-existing, unrelated -- clone.go has no DB-phantom rescan the way the pull path's loadDBPhantoms does; separately tracked). On-disk repository size is close to but slightly smaller than storing everything as raw delta bytes should produce (pikchr 6.81MB -> 6.73MB, wapp 5.64MB -> 5.46MB): zlib on full text already captures most of the redundancy an explicit delta would, so the win here is mainly integrity and convergence, not size.
* fix: bound delta allocation to actual work, validate delta source hex
Two defects from round-two review, plus a stray comment.
1. delta.Apply preallocated its output buffer directly from the delta header's claimed target length (make([]byte, 0, targetLen)). That claim only had to clear maxDeltaTargetSize (4 GiB) to be trusted as an allocation size, so a handful of wire bytes declaring a near-4 GiB target triggered an allocation sized to the claim, not to any work actually done. Harmless as a one-off parse spike; durable once a delta can be stored unverified (see blob.StoreDeltaRaw, this branch) -- a hostile peer plants one such delta and every later Expand of that row repeats the attempt. The initial capacity is now a small fixed bound; append grows it normally for legitimately large content instead of trusting the header's own claim about itself.
2. storeReceivedFile validated the target UUID's hex-ness (hash.IsValidHash) but not the delta source's. The blob table's CHECK constraint only bounds uuid length, not hex-ness, so a non-hex string of valid length passed straight through to blob.StorePhantom and became a permanent, unfillable row -- one the pull path's loadDBPhantoms would then re-request every sync round, forever. deltaSrc now gets the same check as the target uuid, at the same place.
Also deleted a stray doc-comment line left over from an earlier refactor.
Regression tests for both, RED-verified against reverted code before being fixed: the allocation test had to be corrected mid-way through -- delta headers encode their integer in Fossil's own base-64 alphabet, not decimal, so an initial fmt.Sprintf("%d", ...) fixture parsed as a different (still large but differently-bounded) value and passed vacuously; appendInt is the real encoder and is used directly now, with a round-trip sanity check against OutputSize guarding the fixture itself. (user: [email protected], size: 11702) [annotate] [blame] [check-ins using]
package delta import ( "errors" "fmt" "math" ) var ( ErrInvalidDelta = errors.New("delta: invalid format") ErrChecksum = errors.New("delta: checksum mismatch") ) // maxDeltaTargetSize bounds the target length declared in a delta header. // It is far larger than any real Fossil artifact — its purpose is to // reject an obviously-hostile or malformed claim (wire data, never // trusted) before it reaches an allocation or a size column, not to // constrain legitimate content. const maxDeltaTargetSize = 1 << 32 // 4 GiB var digits = [128]int{ -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, -1, -1, -1, -1, 36, -1, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, -1, -1, -1, 63, -1, } type reader struct { data []byte pos int } func (r *reader) getInt() (uint64, error) { if r == nil { panic("delta.getInt: receiver must not be nil") } var v uint64 started := false for r.pos < len(r.data) { c := r.data[r.pos] if c >= 128 || digits[c] < 0 { break } d := uint64(digits[c]) // Reject rather than wrap: v*64+d overflowing uint64 would wrap // silently, and a wrapped value can land anywhere — including // exactly math.MaxUint64, which casts to int64(-1), the phantom // sentinel used throughout blob.size. Wire data gets no benefit // of the doubt here. if v > (math.MaxUint64-d)/64 { return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: integer overflow at pos %d", ErrInvalidDelta, r.pos) } v = v*64 + d r.pos++ started = true } if !started { return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: expected integer at pos %d", ErrInvalidDelta, r.pos) } return v, nil } func (r *reader) getChar() (byte, error) { if r == nil { panic("delta.getChar: receiver must not be nil") } if r.pos >= len(r.data) { return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: unexpected end at pos %d", ErrInvalidDelta, r.pos) } c := r.data[r.pos] r.pos++ return c, nil } // parseTargetLen reads the "<len>\n" header that begins every delta, // without touching anything past it. Apply continues on into the command // stream from the returned reader position; OutputSize stops here. func parseTargetLen(r *reader) (uint64, error) { targetLen, err := r.getInt() if err != nil { return 0, err } term, err := r.getChar() if err != nil { return 0, err } if term != '\n' { return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: expected newline after target length", ErrInvalidDelta) } if targetLen > maxDeltaTargetSize { return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: target length %d exceeds maximum %d", ErrInvalidDelta, targetLen, uint64(maxDeltaTargetSize)) } return targetLen, nil } // OutputSize returns the reconstructed size of a delta's target, read from // the delta header alone. It does not require or touch the source content, // so a delta's expanded size is known even when its base is not yet // available — mirrors Fossil's delta_output_size (src/delta.c). Returns an // error (never panics) on malformed or empty input: deltaBytes is wire // data, not a programmer-controlled argument, so a malformed value is an // input-validation failure, not an assertion failure. func OutputSize(deltaBytes []byte) (uint64, error) { if len(deltaBytes) == 0 { return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: empty delta", ErrInvalidDelta) } return parseTargetLen(&reader{data: deltaBytes}) } // Apply reconstructs target data from source and delta. // Variable naming follows fossil/src/delta.c for cross-reference: // cnt = count, offset = source offset, cmd = command byte func Apply(source, delta []byte) (result []byte, err error) { if source == nil { panic("delta.Apply: source must not be nil") } defer func() { if err == nil && result == nil { panic("delta.Apply: postcondition violated: result is nil with no error") } }() if len(delta) == 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: empty delta", ErrInvalidDelta) } r := &reader{data: delta} targetLen, err := parseTargetLen(r) if err != nil { return nil, err } // The initial capacity is deliberately NOT targetLen: targetLen is a // claim read from the delta's own header, and maxDeltaTargetSize // (which parseTargetLen already bounds it to) exists to reject // obviously-hostile claims, not to size a safe allocation from — a // handful of wire bytes can declare a target near that bound. Once a // delta can be stored unverified (see blob.StoreDeltaRaw), a peer // plants one such delta and every later Expand of that row repeats // the attempt: a durable, remotely-planted allocation, not a one-off // parse spike. Starting small and growing via append tracks actual // work performed instead of trusting the claim. const deltaInitialCap = 64 * 1024 // 64 KiB; append grows normally past this initialCap := targetLen if initialCap > deltaInitialCap { initialCap = deltaInitialCap } output := make([]byte, 0, initialCap) for r.pos < len(r.data) { cnt, err := r.getInt() if err != nil { return nil, err } cmd, err := r.getChar() if err != nil { return nil, err } switch cmd { case '@': // Fossil delta format: count@offset, (first int = byte count, second = source offset) offset, err := r.getInt() if err != nil { return nil, err } term, err := r.getChar() if err != nil { return nil, err } if term != ',' { return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: expected comma in copy command", ErrInvalidDelta) } // Bounds check before casting to int if offset > uint64(len(source)) || cnt > uint64(len(source)) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: copy offset/count overflow", ErrInvalidDelta) } if int(offset+cnt) > len(source) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: copy exceeds source bounds (offset=%d, cnt=%d, srclen=%d)", ErrInvalidDelta, offset, cnt, len(source)) } output = append(output, source[offset:offset+cnt]...) case ':': // Bounds check before casting to int if cnt > uint64(len(r.data)) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: insert count overflow", ErrInvalidDelta) } if r.pos+int(cnt) > len(r.data) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: insert exceeds delta bounds", ErrInvalidDelta) } output = append(output, r.data[r.pos:r.pos+int(cnt)]...) r.pos += int(cnt) case ';': if uint64(len(output)) != targetLen { return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: output size %d != target size %d", ErrInvalidDelta, len(output), targetLen) } if cnt != uint64(Checksum(output)) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: expected %d, got %d", ErrChecksum, Checksum(output), cnt) } return output, nil default: return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: unknown command '%c' at pos %d", ErrInvalidDelta, cmd, r.pos-1) } } return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: missing terminator", ErrInvalidDelta) } // Checksum computes Fossil's delta checksum, matching delta.c's checksum(). // Sum of 4-byte big-endian words, with trailing bytes in big-endian position. func Checksum(data []byte) uint32 { if data == nil { panic("delta.Checksum: data must not be nil") } var sum uint32 i := 0 n := len(data) for n >= 4 { sum += uint32(data[i])<<24 | uint32(data[i+1])<<16 | uint32(data[i+2])<<8 | uint32(data[i+3]) i += 4 n -= 4 } switch n { case 3: sum += uint32(data[i+2]) << 8 fallthrough case 2: sum += uint32(data[i+1]) << 16 fallthrough case 1: sum += uint32(data[i]) << 24 } return sum } const zDigitsEnc = "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz~" type hashEntry struct { offset int next int } // Create generates a delta that transforms source into target. // Variable naming follows fossil/src/delta.c for cross-reference: // nHash = NHASH, ei = entry index, ml = match length, tPos = target position, sOff = source offset func Create(source, target []byte) (result []byte) { if source == nil { panic("delta.Create: source must not be nil") } if target == nil { panic("delta.Create: target must not be nil") } defer func() { if len(result) == 0 { panic("delta.Create: postcondition violated: result is empty") } }() if len(target) == 0 { var buf []byte buf = appendInt(buf, 0) buf = append(buf, '\n') buf = appendInt(buf, uint64(Checksum(target))) buf = append(buf, ';') return buf } if len(source) < 16 { return createInsertAll(target) } heads, entries, mask := buildHashTable(source) return emitMatches(source, target, heads, entries, mask) } func buildHashTable(source []byte) (heads []int, entries []hashEntry, mask int) { const nHash = 16 tableSize := len(source) / nHash if tableSize < 64 { tableSize = 64 } for tableSize&(tableSize-1) != 0 { tableSize &= tableSize - 1 } tableSize <<= 1 mask = tableSize - 1 heads = make([]int, tableSize) entries = make([]hashEntry, 0, len(source)/nHash) for i := 0; i+nHash <= len(source); i += nHash { h := rollingHash(source[i : i+nHash]) idx := int(h) & mask entries = append(entries, hashEntry{offset: i, next: heads[idx] - 1}) heads[idx] = len(entries) } return heads, entries, mask } func emitMatches(source, target []byte, heads []int, entries []hashEntry, mask int) []byte { const nHash = 16 var buf []byte buf = appendInt(buf, uint64(len(target))) buf = append(buf, '\n') var pendingInsert []byte tPos := 0 flushInsert := func() { if len(pendingInsert) > 0 { buf = appendInt(buf, uint64(len(pendingInsert))) buf = append(buf, ':') buf = append(buf, pendingInsert...) pendingInsert = pendingInsert[:0] } } for tPos < len(target) { bestLen := 0 bestOff := 0 if tPos+nHash <= len(target) { h := rollingHash(target[tPos : tPos+nHash]) idx := int(h) & mask ei := heads[idx] for ei > 0 { e := entries[ei-1] sOff := e.offset if sOff+nHash <= len(source) && matchLen(source[sOff:], target[tPos:]) >= nHash { ml := matchLen(source[sOff:], target[tPos:]) if ml > bestLen { bestLen = ml bestOff = sOff } } ei = e.next + 1 } } if bestLen >= nHash { flushInsert() // Fossil delta format: count@offset, buf = appendInt(buf, uint64(bestLen)) buf = append(buf, '@') buf = appendInt(buf, uint64(bestOff)) buf = append(buf, ',') tPos += bestLen } else { pendingInsert = append(pendingInsert, target[tPos]) tPos++ } } flushInsert() buf = appendInt(buf, uint64(Checksum(target))) buf = append(buf, ';') return buf } func createInsertAll(target []byte) []byte { if len(target) == 0 { panic("delta.createInsertAll: target length must be > 0") } var buf []byte buf = appendInt(buf, uint64(len(target))) buf = append(buf, '\n') buf = appendInt(buf, uint64(len(target))) buf = append(buf, ':') buf = append(buf, target...) buf = appendInt(buf, uint64(Checksum(target))) buf = append(buf, ';') return buf } func appendInt(buf []byte, v uint64) []byte { if v == 0 { return append(buf, '0') } var tmp [13]byte i := len(tmp) for v > 0 { i-- tmp[i] = zDigitsEnc[v&0x3f] v >>= 6 } return append(buf, tmp[i:]...) } func rollingHash(data []byte) uint32 { if len(data) == 0 { panic("delta.rollingHash: data length must be > 0") } var h uint32 for _, b := range data { h = h*37 + uint32(b) } return h } func matchLen(a, b []byte) int { if a == nil { panic("delta.matchLen: a must not be nil") } if b == nil { panic("delta.matchLen: b must not be nil") } n := len(a) if len(b) < n { n = len(b) } for i := 0; i < n; i++ { if a[i] != b[i] { return i } } return n }